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A NEW CASE FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
^y
. 1James J. Tritten-^
Some would argue that the issue of naval arms control is
dead, no longer a threat to our fleet, and not worthy of active
consideration. On the contrary, the subject of naval arms con-
trol is alive and well, discussed often and vehemently in confer-
ences routinely held throughout the world — generally without
the participation of the U.S. Navy. Attending these conferences
gives one the impression that some nations of the world intend to
create regulatory regimes that would first: oversee civilian
merchant ships, such as the Japanese freighter that recently
sailed with plutonium; then intrude into functional areas, such
as the environment, that no Navy could object to; and eventually
spill over into the direct regulation of naval warships.
This paper resurrects the issue of naval arms control and
admits that it is something that the United States is doing
anyway — despite the oft-made argument that there is a dangerous
"slippery slope" which threatens to scuttle the fleet. This
paper then argues that there are a series of measure that the
U.S. ought to get more involved with due to the changed interna-
tional security environment. Rather than ignoring the issue of
verification and compliance, this paper then includes a section
on these two issues. It concludes with an examination of the
issue of "stonewalling" on the subject of naval arms control.
This paper will use the term naval arms control in its most
broad form. It includes actions taken in the formal form of
treaties, less formal executive agreements, even less formal
agreements between navies, and even unilateral measures -- as
long as the action can be described as having met the fundamental
criteria of arms control. The arms control community reached
consensus in the early 1960s on three basic goals of arms con-
trol.-^ First, the likelihood of war should be reduced because of
reduced military capabilities and a reduction in the fear over a
surprise attack. Second, if war breaks out despite our best
efforts, the limited availability and/or capability of weapons
should reduce the consequences of the war. Third, there should be
a reduction in the costs of maintaining military forces because
of limitations on weaponry, personnel, and/or operations.
These criteria should be used to assess the worth of past
agreements and the arms control measures discussed herein. A
treaty or the lack thereof, are not serious measures of the
effectiveness or success of a nation's arms control efforts. If
1. The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not
necessarily represent those of the U.S. government. Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Navy.
these goals can be attained without a treaty or other formal
arrangement, then contrived negotiations are unnecessary. Hence
virtually any actions that meet the goals outlined above are
considered naval arms control herein.
We Are Doing It Anyway
1
The U.S. Navy has fostered the illusion that the firm posi-
tion of the U.S. government is to not participate in any arms
control agreements that involve naval forces. That assertion is
simply an myth which does not bear up under the scrutiny of even
a cursory review of existing arms control agreements.^ Consider
the following agreements which currently involve naval forces or
operations:
Historical Naval Arms Agreements Still in Force
The 1817 Rush-Bagot Treaty between the U.S. and Great Bri-
tain restricted naval forces allowed on the Great Lakes — naval
arms control of numbers and types of forces in a specific geo-
graphic area designed to reduce the risks of war. This treaty
remains in force today between the U.S. and Canada. The transit
of U.S. naval forces through the Turkish Straits is regulated by
the 1936 Montreaux Convention as another attempt to regulate the
risks and/or consequences of war. The Montreaux Convention also
regulates what warships may do while in transit through Turkish
internal waters; e.g. they may not fly aircraft.
Transit by warships involves a special set of measures taken
to control the actions of foreign warships. The 1888 Constantino-
ple Suez Canal Convention was reaffirmed by the government of
Egypt allowing the full transit of the canal by the warships of
any nation, even in time of war. The provisions of the 1919
Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, required Germany
to allow the passage of any warship through the Kiel Canal as
long as Germany was at peace with that nation. The Kiel Canal
provisions of the long-ago abrogated Versailles Treaty remain in
force, however. The 1977 Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neu-
trality and Operations of the Panama Canal also provides for
passage of warships, even in time of war. During passage through
any canal — as through any nation ;s internal waters — there are
obvious restrictions on the activities of warships that provide a
degree of security for the state through whose territory the
canal passes or the state administering the canal. Such restric-
tions are accepted by the U.S. as customary international law.
Eight Hague Conventions signed in 1907 contain certain basic
laws of war pertaining to the seas that attempt to regulate the
consequences of war. These include: the status of enemy merchant
vessels at the outbreak of war, the conversion of merchant ships
into warships, the laying of automatic submarine contact mines,
torpedoes, shore bombardment by naval forces during wartime, the
right of capture, and the rights and duties of neutrals. These
Hague rules have long been accepted as binding on the United
States as customary international law."* The 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions govern the immunity of hospital ships in a clear attempt to
regulate the consequences of war.
The behavior of the U.S. Navy was recently called into
question under these Hague Conventions regarding the shore bom-
bardment of Vietnam and later in Lebanon by the USS NEW JERSEY in
1983. American behavior, under the Hague rules, has also been
questioned with regard to the placement of naval mines first in
Vietnam and later in Nicaragua.^ The later resulted in a court
case before the International Court of Justice. Although the
U.S. argued that what it did was not contrary to international
law, the existing regulations on the employment of naval weapons
at sea were clearly obstacles that had to be considered by the
operational commander.
More Recent Regulations on Navy Conventional Forces
A series of agreements dealing with the law of the sea all
contain measures which, in part, reduce the risks of war be
defining the rights and duties of nations with respect to their
jurisdiction over ocean space and the ships that they put to sea.
The rights of foreign warships are restricted when passing
through the territorial sea of another state in accordance with
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) , which the
U.S. did sign and ratify, and the subsequent 1982 United Nations-
sponsored LOS Treaty, which the U.S. did not sign. Most provi-
sions of the 1982 LOS Treaty have been accepted by the U.S. as
customary international law.
Similarly, the activities of warships transiting certain
international straits and archipelagic waters are regulated by
the law of the sea. When transiting international straits under
the regime of transit passage, foreign warships are prohibited
from the threat or use of force against the applicable coastal
states. They are also to refrain from activities not part of
those usually required for swift transit. Lesser restrictions
apply for archipelagic transit. The rights of warships to board
ships on the high seas, the right of hot pursuit, and rights over
the continental shelves were also agreed to in these LOS trea-
ties.
Following a series of international incidents between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, these two countries, in 1989, agreed
to a uniform interpretation of the rules on innocent passage
through the territorial sea.° The earlier 1988 Regional Air
Safety Agreement between the U.S., Japan, and the USSR and the
1989 U.S. /Soviet Bering Straits Region Commission all contain
confidence-building measures (CBMs) that extend to the ocean
areas.
The 1972 U.S. and Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA)
had a major affect on the operating procedures that were then
ongoing in the fleet. ^ In 1975, an additional protocol extended
the provisions of this agreement to civilian ships. A subsequent
1989 bilateral Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) Agreement
expanded the transparency of our military actions to other war-
fare areas. Similar agreements have been signed by the USSR and
other nations, including some of our NATO allies. ^ Russia will
probably soon sign another with Japan. Such activities can be
viewed either as genuine arms control measures, since they at-
tempt to reduce the risks of war, or as CBMs. The U.S. Navy
openly supports these agreements, but generally refrains from
calling them arms control.
Amphibious exercises in the European theater have been
voluntarily regulated for years by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.
Amphibious exercises, including the operations of naval forces
involved in those exercises, were then similarly more formally
governed by the 1986 Stockholm accords. ^^ These agreements have
now been superseded by the 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence-
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) . We have promised to give
42 days notification of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-
sized amphibious landing in Europe. Notification includes full
disclosure of commands and forces involved and planned ship-to-
shore gunfire and support.
The 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
includes a political commitment outside of the actual treaty
framework to regulate the number of land-based combat naval
aircraft in Europe. -^^ This agreement is being renegotiated due to
the demise of the Soviet Union but will likely be retained in a
somewhat altered state that includes this political commitment.
If current trends in downsizing military forces in Europe
under CFE continue, the fundamental role of ground and air forces
in Europe will shift, thus directly affecting the established
role of naval forces. Already we have seen NATO promulgate a new
military concept of operations and military strategy with empha-
sis on forward presence and crisis response rather than forward
defense and the AIRLAND battle. CFE and the new NATO military
strategy no longer require forward defense by combat naval forces
in the European theater. The shift to forward presence and
crisis response as the principal missions undermines the more
contentious aspects of NATO's old maritime concepts of operations
— including strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) against Soviet
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) . The point
is that CFE might not directly regulate naval forces, but it most
certainly affects them.
The 1992 Open Skies Treaty allows the overflight of U.S.
naval bases and facilities in Europe and North America by mili-
tary aircraft of foreign nations, including Russia. The agree-
ment allows overflight by short-notice unarmed surveillance air-
craft equipped with panoramic, framing and video cameras, infra-
red line-scanning devices, and synthetic aperture radars. Cam-
eras will capable of taking pictures with resolutions down to 30
centimeters and infra-red capable of 50 centimeters resolution.
If nothing else, this agreement will require the U.S. Navy to
consider alterations of its peacetime deployment patterns, exer-
cises, and other activities that it does not desire to display.
Unilateral steps taken by the U.S. to downsize its armed
forces under the Base Force are well-known and have achieved more
reductions in military hardware than the most dedicated efforts
of arms control proponents. The Bush administration Base Force
would have taken the U.S. Navy down from a nominal 600 ships to a
fleet of around 450. With the election of Bill Clinton and a
Democratically-controlled Congress, it is likely that additional
unilateral cuts will continue to somewhere around 300 ships in
the fleet. This reduction may be termed Base Force II, or some
other number indicating how many internal revisions to the Base
Force were planned but never made public heretofore.
The net result of these unilateral reductions is that the
U.S. will be unable to respond to a crisis at the strategic- and
operational-levels of warfare with only national forces. For
such responses, the participation of ad-hoc coalitions, allies,
and host nation support are assumed. Furthermore, as the U.S.
armed forces continue to be scaled back, any U.S. response will
have to be a joint response, not just one limited to the sea
services. These results may not be due to any international
negotiations nor treaties, but they are certainly compatible with
the goals of naval arms control proponents.
Due to these unilateral actions, the basic goals of naval
arms control are now being achieved without any involvement of
the arms control community. Indeed, the subject of naval arms
control has received little or no recent attention even from
traditional supporters within the U.S. primarily due to the
realization that their efforts might complicate and delay the
cuts that were going to happen anyway.
Navy Offensive Nuclear Forces
There are a whole series of nuclear arms control agreements
that the Navy acknowledges exist, but generally does not see as
setting a precedent for the control of conventional naval arms.
Denial cannot change the facts of the matter, however. The com-
plex relationship of nuclear forces and capabilities to conven-
tional naval forces is a topJ.c on which I have written elsewhere
and will not repeat herein. Suffice it to say that the control
over naval nuclear armaments has a direct effect on the require-
ment and the budget authority available for conventional forces.
For example, if the Russians were to disavow their sea-based leg
of their strategic nuclear triad, it would undermine the program-
ming requirements for the SEAWOLF and CENTURION nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs)
.
Existing nuclear agreements that regulate naval forces
includes the 1972 Protocol and the Interim Agreement associated
with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) . The SALT I
Interim Agreement regulates the number of U.S. modern ballistic
missile submarines at 44 and submarine-launched ballistic missile
launchers (SLBMs) on SSBNs at 656. The general approach during
SALT I was to codify the planned building program for the super-
powers rather than to reduce existing or programmed arms; hence
SALT I really did not reduce costs associated with the Navy but
it can be argued that it did reduce the risk of war.
Naval strategic nuclear forces were also regulated by the
1979 SALT II Treaty and associated agreed statements. SALT II 's
status remains somewhat clouded since it never fully entered into
force yet appears to be at least partially adhered to by both the
U.S. and Russia. ^° SALT II regulates SLBM launcher numbers and
the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) permitted aboard POSEIDON
and TRIDENT SLBMs.
The SALT II Treaty also prohibited cruise missiles with
ranges in excess of 600 kilometers; cruise missiles of over 600
kilometers range with multiple independently targetable warheads;
ballistic missiles or launchers with ranges in excess of 600
kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than
submarines; ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement
on the ocean floor; and SLBMs with a throw-weight greater than
then-current Soviet SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM)
.
SALT II, like SALT I, was not intended to significantly
reduce U.S. nuclear forces, but merely codified the existing
force structure.^ It would have only reduced costs on the
margin. SALT II did regulate areas where one might have argued
for growth in nuclear force structure and it did curb certain
technical advances. Although the SALT II treaty was never rati-
fied, it was fully adhered to for some years, contributing to the
perceived need to retire some SSBNs and forestalling the develop-
ment of advanced cruise missiles for naval aircraft.
The U.S. government has recently negotiated an additional
nuclear arms control agreement which has a significant impact on
existing and planned naval forces; the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Talks (START) agreement with the USSR,-^^ Again, naval
nuclear forces would be affected by this new agreement. START
has yet to fully be ratified, primarily due to the political
demise of the USSR. Its provisions are expected to be adhered to
by Russia and three other former Soviet nuclear-capable repub-
lics.
In his January 28, 1992 State of the Union Address, Presi-
dent Bush announced unilateral moves that went beyond what was
negotiated in START. These included the end of the production of
a new warhead for U.S. SLBMs — included as a part of the Base
Force cutbacks. In a January 29, 1992 follow-on press briefing
and news release. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney added that it was
the TRIDENT II SLBM ' s W-88 warhead that would be terminated.
In this 1992 State of the Union address. Bush also offered
additional reductions in nuclear forces if Russia agreed to
eliminate all ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reen-
try vehicles (MIRVs) . Specifically, Bush stated that the U.S.
would reduce its SLBM warheads by 1/3. After reviewing the START
Treaty and the Base Force, it appears that the U.S. will only
outfit the newest ten OHIO-class SSBNs with the TRIDENT II (D-5)
missile and retain the older TRIDENT I (C-4) SLBM aboard the
first eight.
The State of the Union offer was followed by U.S. /Soviet
political agreements in July 1992 on deeper cuts in nuclear
forces. These deeper cuts, if ratified, will require each side
to reconsider whether it retains all three legs of its triad or
shifts to a dyad or monad. If Russia decides to shift the bulk
of their strategic nuclear warheads to sea, as we are, their re-
maining SSBNs will become magnets for attack by conventional
forces. Such an action would support arguments made by the U.S.
Navy that it needs SEAWOLF or CENTURION SSNs.
As the numbers of warheads that each nuclear superpower can
retain continues to fall, targeteers will eventually reach a
point where they cannot "service" all of the targets in the
other's homeland.-^ Such a situation will force consideration of
a fundamental shift in targeting strategy to countervalue making
promptness less important. If nuclear retaliation is not time
urgent, and if the U.S. Navy continues to absorb the bulk of the
burden of the nuclear deterrence mission, we will not need to
routinely place our SSBNs within, or at least near, missile-
firing range of Russia. Indeed, if Russia is officially no
longer our enemy, there is no reason that our SSBNs need to be
near missile firing range of that nation on a daily basis. This
would open up entirely different deployment options for these
forces — cruising the vast ocean areas with perhaps routine port
calls.
Existing nuclear arms controls also includes the testing of
nuclear warheads under the water — regulated by the Limited Test
Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963. Fleet nuclear warhead tests are also
restricted in yield by the still-unratif ied Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of
1974. Navy nuclear technology is controlled by the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a series of additional agreements
such as the 1977 agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) , and a 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material. Most of these measures sought to reduce the
risks and/or consequences of nuclear war.
Nuclear War at Sea
Nuclear war at sea has been made less likely by a number of
CBMs, such as: the "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963; the "Accidents
Measures" Agreement of 1971; the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
Agreement of 1987; and the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
Agreement of 1988. The latter two require advance notification
of SLBM tests. All attempt to reduce the likelihood of war.
The Navy is bound by the existence of a "zone of peace" —
the entire ocean area south of 60® south latitude -- defined by
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The Navy was also bound to adhere
to the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) when
the U.S. government ratified the Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone
Treaty (Tlatelolco) of 1967. This treaty prohibits the testing,
deployment, and threat to use nuclear weapons against contracting
parties in vast areas of the Atlantic Ocean.
Maritime nuclear weapons have not been developed for use on
the world's seabeds outside of one's territorial seas in accor-
dance with the Seabeds Arms Control Treaty of 1971 and in space
in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty — other zones of
peace/nuclear free zones. Both of these agreements have inhibited
development of forces that the U.S. government has desired to
pursue.^ A more extensive nuclear free zone was established in
the South Pacific by the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga (SPNFZ)
.
Although the U.S. is not a party to this agreement, a customary
international law servitude may be created if the U.S. does not
challenge this convention by the continued transit of these
waters by ships and aircraft that it will not deny have nuclear
weapons.
In his September 27, 1991 television address to the nation,
President George Bush announced that he had unilaterally ordered
significant reductions in the numbers of naval tactical nuclear
weapons and their immediate removal from fleet units -- goals
long sought after by proponents of naval arms control/ This was
an actual act of naval arms control not announced as an integral
part of the Base Force as were unilateral reductions in strategic
nuclear forces. Although these measures achieved the goals of
naval arms control. Navy spokesmen have denied that they consti-
tute an actual act of naval arms control. Such is the strength
of the anti-naval arms control lobby and the fear of the "slip-
pery-slope" within the Navy.
Navy Defensive Nuclear Forces
Despite the rhetoric of the Bush administration to include
naval forces in a program for Global Protection Against Limited
Strike (GPALS) , the Navy is regulated by the Antiballistic Mis-
sile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 prohibiting sea-based ABM systems. The
major arms control goal of the ABM Treaty was to shift the phi-
losophy of nuclear deterrence to one that would accommodate
mutual assured destruction (MAD) and thereby reduce costs. A
minimal deployment of a modest ABM or GPALS system is not incon-
sistent with MAD but would serve to protect the U.S. from acci-
dental, unauthorized, or small attacks.
The Navy has traditionally disowned roles and missions that
would tie the fleet to close-aboard continental defenses, prefer-
ring to argue that the first line of defense is right off the
shores of the enemy. Under today's constrained budgets, the Navy
may revisit this policy and attempt to get a piece of any action
-- even the defense of North America. Advanced concepts for
forward deployed and mobile GPALS to protect American allies or
expeditionary forces might include components aboard surface
ships, aircraft carriers, or submarines.
Miscellaneous Regulations
The Navy does not test, exercise, or possess biological and
chemical weapons in compliance with the Geneva Protocol of 1925
and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. The Navy
will obviously comply with the new 1992 Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC) . ^ It furthermore is bound to the restrictions on
military or other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques contained in the Environmental Modification Convention
(ENMOD) of 1977.^^
In the area of nuclear forces, the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) created to monitor SALT has in itself resulted
in the creation of a number of understandings and/or regulations
on nuclear forces that the U.S. Navy is obligated to follow. ^-^
Similar consultative commissions, such as the Special Verifica-
tion Commission (SVC) and the Joint Compliance and Implementation
Commission ( JCIC) , have been created for other arms control
treaties, such as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty and CFE, and should be expected to create additional
obligations for the Navy as well.
In summation, Table 1 outlines how the Navy is already
regulated by arms control:
TABLE 1
EXISTING NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Reduction of the Risks of War
Rush-Bagot Treaty, 1817, restrictions in Great Lakes
Montreaux Convention, 1936, Turkish Straits transit
Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1958, maritime laws
Antarctic Treaty, 1959, zone of peace
Hot Line, 1963, CBM
Tlatelolco, 1967, NWFZ
NPT, 1968, nuclear and technology proliferation
Accidents Measures, 1971, CBM
Seabed Agreement, 1971, NWFZ
SALT I Interim Agreement, 1972, SSBN/SLBMs
SALT I ABM Treaty, 1972, sea-based ABM
INCSEA, 1972, 1975, CBMs
Helsinki Final Act, 1975, amphibious exercises
IAEA agreement, 1977, nuclear and technology proliferation
SALT II, 1979, SSBN/SLBMs, cruise missiles
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
1980, nuclear and technology proliferation
UN Law of the Sea Treaty, 1982, maritime laws
Stockholm Accords, 1986, amphibious exercises
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, 1987, CBM
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification, 1988, CBM
US/USSR/Japan Regional Air Safety Agreement, 1988, CBMs
DMA, 1989, CBMs
US/USSR agreement on innocent passage, 1989, maritime laws
US/USSR Bering Straits Region Commission, 1989, CBMs
Vienna CSBMs, 1990, amphibious exercises
Base Force, 1990, reduction of fleet by h of 1990 levels
CFE, 1990, land-based naval aviation, overall security
Removal of tactical nucs, 1991, unilateral reduction
START, 1991, SSBN/SLBMs
Deep cuts, 1992, SSBN/SLBMs
Open Skies, 1992, intelligence-gathering overflights
Base Force II, 1993, by ^ of 1990 levels
General restrictions on activities while transiting canals
sec and similar non-Treaty obligations
II. Reduction in the Consequences of War
Hague Conventions, 1907, laws of war at sea
Geneva Protocol, 1925, chemical warfare
Geneva Convention, 1949, immunity of hospital ships
Antarctic Treaty, 1959, zone of peace
LTBT, 1963, nuclear testing
Tlatelolco, 1967, NWFZ
Seabed Agreement, 1971, NWFZ
SALT I Interim Agreement, 1972, SSBN/SLBMs
BWC, 1972, biological weapons
TTBT/PNET, 1974, nuclear testing
ENMOD, 1977, environmental warfare
Base Force, 1990, reduction of fleet by h of 1990 levels
START, 1991, SSBN/SLBMs
Removal of tactical nucs, 1991, unilateral reduction
Deep cuts, 1992, SSBN/SLBMs
CWC, 1992, chemical weapons
Base Force II, 1993, by h of 1990 levels
III. Reductions in the Cost of Naval Forces
SALT I ABM Treaty, 1972, sea-based ABM
Base Force, 1990, reduction of fleet by h of 1990 levels
START, 1991, SSBN/SLBMs
Removal of tactical nucs, 1991, unilateral reduction
Deep cuts, 1992, SSBN/SLBMs
Base Force II, 1993, by ^ of 1990 levels
Source: the author
Implications
It is entirely incorrect to say that the Navy is not a
"player" in arms control already. By admitting that it is alrea-
dy a player, the Navy should recognize that they have been able
to successfully participate in the arms control arena for years
without paying the heavy price of dangerous fleet reductions that
were the legacy of the 1920s and 30s. A "slippery slope" may
exist, but the Navy has demonstrated that it is an alpine climber
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par excellence and has managed to traverse the slope without
falling in to the crevasses. Indeed, the only serious erosions
to the conventional forces of the fleet in the past forty-seven
years have been as the result of normal internal political ac-
tions in response changes in the external international environ-
ment.
It is also entirely inappropriate for the now reorganized
naval staff to reissue the following informal business card, once
distributed by the old Strategic Concepts Group, OP-603, in the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations:
JUST SAY NO
TO NAVAL ARMS CONTROU
h'$ not In U.S. Interests and we )ust don't Hke It.
Conventional Arms Control Cell Pentagon RM #4ES 14
Strateoic CONCErrs Group (OP-603) <703) e95-4499
CNO/Navy Staff in the Pentagon Autovon 229>4499
Washington, D.C. 20350'2000 Fax <202) 693-7969
If one considers the overall actions being taken by the U.S.
government to downsize its nuclear forces, the fleet and naval
air force, and to reduce forward bases and presence, they have
exceeded the wildest expectations of the most ardent naval arms
control proponents of the past decade. Indeed, this author has
already heard one very senior Bush administration political
appointee ponder, in a closed forum, whether we should consider
embracing arms control as a tool to delay or derail cuts result-
ing from the defense "freefall." Similar arguments have been
made on the pages of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. ^
The new national security strategy outlined by the Bush
administration and the new regionally-focused national military
strategy promulgated by the current Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
are license to revisit conventional wisdom on naval arms control.
Simply put, with a totally new international security environ-
ment, it is the time to look at this subject again, from the
perspective of how it might enhance the national security of the
U.S. and help the U.S. Navy as an enabling force under our new
national military strategy. Naval arms control was a bad idea
under the old international security environment, but objec-
tions to arms control based upon "old-thinking"^^ must now go the
way of the former "evil empire."
Appropriate Confidence Building Measures
There are some modest CBMs that simply are good ideas and
should be actively pursued now due to the new international
security environment. These are all peripheral measures that do
not involve major polices or central weapons systems. Acknowl-
edging them as "arms control" means going down the "slippery
slope," but after all, we have already been on that slope for
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years and have managed to prevent it from emaciating the fleet to
the extent that recent budget reductions did! Each of the fol-
lowing measures should be considered from the perspective of
contributing to the security of the U.S. in a radically new
international security context. None is particularly contentious
and would probably only be opposed by the Navy due to the old
"slippery slope" argument. We are doing most of these anyway and
simply need to do more.
First and most important, we need to formalize and regular-
ize our already open exchanges of maritime/naval data with other
nations, principly the republics of the former USSR. Specifical-
ly, we need to know which republic owns what forces, what are
there hull numbers, home ports, and status (active/reserve).
Granted the information provided openly might not be entirely
accurate, but it would supplement what the government finds out
using its own sources and what we can learn from the media.
Proposed transfers between fleets might also be an area for
an exchange of data that would avoid the problems associated with
the transfer of the Russian aircraft carrier KUZNETSOV between
their Black and Northern Fleets. What would be wrong with asking
for a declaration of shifts between major fleets? On our side,
this information is probably routinely reported in Navy Times.
Do we yet understand which naval aviation units will be trans-
ferred between the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy? Is
there anything wrong with simply asking the Russians?
Open exchange of non-sensitive data, such as the names,
classes, and home ports of major ships, should be non-threatening
to the U.S. since this data is generally published in open-source
information. If we can exchange even more sensitive data for
strategic and theater nuclear forces and similar data for ground
and air forces, why not build confidence by helping each other
understand the other's naval force structure?
With the change of our focus to regional presence and crisis
management, we need to build a better data base on arms transfers
as well. We need information on those who would sell arms to
those who might buy them. An open exchange of pending arms sales
and transfers would help us predict the future threat environment
at sea. The government might find that this information is
already available from private sources and can be openly pur-
chased at modest costs. The intelligence community could add its
own information rather than attempt to duplicate what is already
commercially available.
Secondly, we need more transparency in military policy,
doctrine, strategy, operational art, peacetime deployment pat-
terns and force acquisition plans. Most of this information is
available on the U.S. for those nations who care to invest in
open-source collection, but quite frankly, we need help in under-
standing where the Russian government is going with its military.
Simply put, we are seeing mixed signals, with signs towards
defensive defense and a large high-seas fleet. ^^ The Russian
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government could go a long way to build confidence in their
apparent shift towards a defensive military policy, doctrine, and
strategy by unilaterally disclosing why they need a fleet, how it
would be employed in peacetime and war, and what size and type
forces will it have?
The U.S. and Russia have been expanding their navy to navy
contacts at the operational level. This needs to extend to
exchanges of faculty at our war colleges, with our government and
private think tanks, with serious scholars and not simply "for
show" visits of warships and senior officers. It will not be
easy to break the habits of looking first to the other nation as
the principal threat and mirror-imaging concepts of warfare. We
must expand international military educational contacts and
engage in joint research in the areas of military policy, doc-
trine, strategy, and operational art.
One of the major leaks of the fears of top-level Communist
Party (CPSU) and Soviet intelligence leaders was that provided by
retired KGB [Committee on State Security] General Oleg Gordievs-
j^y 29 rpj^g KGB's Operation RYAN, a collection effort in the early
and mid-1980s to warn of a "bolt-from-the-blue" attack by the
West on the USSR, was reported by Gordievsky and apparently was
real. This is an example of how bad the CPSU and KGB understood
us and how dangerous it was for the U.S. to publish declaratory
war-fighting nuclear and naval strategies and to have conducted
certain types of aggressive deployments with its naval and air
forces. What we intuitively understood were actions taken to
reinforce deterrence apparently were totally misunderstood by the
other side as an actual threat to peace.
Similarly, although we thought we understood Soviet concepts
for war in Europe, recent leaks of war plans found in the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR) portend a different conclusion.
Authentic Warsaw Pact war plans were recently published by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in their
journal Survival . Apparently nuclear operations were indeed to
begin early in any war with the West but they would have been
limited to the Western Theater of Military Strategic Operations
(WTVD) . This is not what we thought at the time and the error is
not trivial.
Although the Navy's 1980 's Maritime Strategy focuses primar-
ily on global conventional war, it infers that if war were to go
nuclear ashore, then war would go nuclear at sea as well. If the
war ashore was to go nuclear quickly, then this would have under-
mined the basic assumptions in the Maritime Strategy of a pro-
longed conventional stage in which the correlation of nuclear
forces might be altered. It was this assumption that justified
actions to be taken during the conventional stage of the war and
supported the programming decisions to build expensive ASW forces
that would have a role in altering the correlation of forces.
We both need to understand each other much better than we
apparently did in the past. Additional exchanges of military
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scholars might help each of us understand the other better so
that we can avoid repeating past mistakes. The current open
"window" in Russia may not stay open and we should take maximum
advantage of the opportunity to learn and teach.
If both the U.S. and Russia have shifted their military
focus to crises, including crises involving each other, then the
third area of immediate naval arms control should be to expand
our existing agreements to defuse crises at sea. The existing
bilateral INCSEA and recent high level meetings between the
military staffs appear as constructive moves. INCSEA could be
signed on a bilateral basis by all sea powers — bilateral ar-
rangements being easier to tailor and negotiate. "^^ Once bilater-
al arrangements have been reached, it is likely that we could
eventually negotiate regional and perhaps even a multilateral
agreement open to all maritime nations. INCSEA should be expand-
ed to include non-interference with submarine or aircraft opera-
tions and to preclude all types of training attacks conducted by
military ships and aircraft against civilian ships and aircraft.
Fourth we can continue to expand maritime cooperation ef-
forts between navies. At a minimum, routine administrative
procedures can be set up for position reporting to assist search
and rescue (SAR) , and low-level cooperative arrangements could be
made for SAR, to combat piracy, and to stem the flow of drugs at
sea. The record of accidents at sea during the past years
strongly suggests cooperation is needed. Cooperation in
oceanography, hydrography, and meteorology could make sailing
under, on, or flying over the oceans a more safe endeavor.
Moreover, the signing of cooperative research agreements can
themselves be confidence building blocks.
The 1937 Nyon Treaty, which can be argued as having set a
precedent in customary international law, contains a code of
combat behavior expected of submarines in situations less than a
fully-declared war — perhaps very instructive today. "^-^ The U.S.
plans to redirect the attention of its submarine force from
concentration on antisubmarine warfare to presence and crisis
response. Problems associated with the use of submarines in the
Spanish Civil War and World War II might be reviewed to see if
there are any lessons, and customary international law obliga-
tions, that might pertain in today's planned use of such forces.
Hence, fifth. The unresolved issues of the laws of submarine war-
fare should probably be openly discussed at a special interna-
tional forum with the goal of an international convention to
codify these laws of war and clear up existing misperceptions. ^^
Revising Current Policies
The above initial five efforts would act as building-block
CBMs which might enhance the legitimate performance of naval
missions at sea and help defuse crises. A second series of nine
measures involve directly addressing previous policies that made
perfect sense under the old international security environment,
but may not under current conditions. In each case, we should
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expect a knee-jerk reaction from the Navy based upon "old think-
ing" and the "slippery slope" argument. What the author suggests
is that old objections be rejustified under the new international
security environment, if they can be. Each of the following nine
measures is contentious, but all can be justified as good ideas
and less threatening today, to the Navy, than they were previous-
ly.
Since the U.S. Navy accepted the loss of its tactical nu-
clear weaponry at sea, we should first, abolish our policy of
neither confirming nor denying (NCND) that our major warships
carry tactical nuclear weapons. The President told the world
that these weapons were being removed. Most nations believe that
this has already been done. The Army and Air Force routinely
denied to other countries that their bases or forces are nuclear
capable, albeit on a general and not specific basis. Arguing
that we need the policy just in case we return these weapons
later is like the Army retaining policies for the care and feed-
ing of animals in its horse cavalry. If we ever put the tactical
nuclear weapons back on our ships and aircraft, we can reinsti-
tute the policy. NCND has caused enough problems with Western
nations. ^^
A related issue is, second, no first tactical nuclear use at
sea. Our tactical maritime weapons have been removed anyway. If
we ever put the weapons back on our ships, that move would au-
tomatically require revisiting this policy. Operation DESERT
STORM demonstrated that we can deal with an emerging nuclear
threat without resorting to tactical nuclear threat or use. If
the U.S. promises to not use tactical nuclear weapons first at
sea, it could tie the deterrence of maritime tactical nuclear
war, as it did with the USSR, to a threat to expand the war
ashore. In any case, it was never in the interest of the U.S.
Navy, or any Western navy, to fight a tactical nuclear war at
sea.
Third, although additional NWFZs and/or "zones of peace" may
not necessarily have been in the West's best interests previous-
ly, can we say that in the present international security
environment? An exemption can be made for weapons carried by
SSBNs. Since we no longer have tactical nuclear weapons at sea,
why not regulate such weapons in specific areas of the world's
oceans where we would not want to see them appear. It would also
be useful to see which governments would be unwilling to sign
such an agreement. •'^
NWFZs might first be established where the Navy has already
accepted "zones of peace" and similar restrictions. For example,
the first NWFZ might be in the Antarctic, where such restrictions
have essentially been accepted, but would be formalized by a new
treaty. Other candidate areas would be those areas of the
world's oceans where the Navy knows that it would never want to
see nuclear weapons deployed anyway; e.g. Hudson's Bay. Other
nations of the world might want to organize their own NWFZs, much
the same as the South Pacific Forum organized SPNFZ, without the
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participation of the U.S. As the U.S. shifts is military strate-
gy for nuclear deterrence, it might want to even consider a NWFZ
in the Arctic. Such a zone might regulate Russian deployments of
SSBNs in this area and negate the requirement for expensive
under-the-ice capabilities for SSNs.
Agreements on the notification of ballistic missile tests,
and on the prevention of dangerous military activities, were
recently signed by the superpowers. Perhaps, fourth, we can agree
as well on advance notification of operational-level maritime
exercises and aviation exercises conducted over the oceans. This
is essentially what we adopted in the Stockholm Document and
subsequent Vienna CSBMs. For safety reasons. Western navies
already routinely issues notices to mariners and notices to
airmen when they plan to conduct major exercises. Advance no-
tifications are also given prior to the transit of the Turkish
and Danish Straits.
Notification of planned exercises might be limited to those
which the other side finds most threatening; such as flushing of
all SSBNs from port, conducting a large-scale amphibious exercise
near another coastal state, or conducting a major external air
forces power projection exercise. Tactical-level exercises would
not be regulated. Although advance notification clearly under-
mines the principle of freedom of the seas, it is better to
promise to notify prior to an exercise rather than to have exer-
cises more severely regulated.
Since we already exchange inspectors in accordance with CFE
and nuclear agreements, why not require observers during opera-
tional-level fleet exercises as well? Clearly there are a number
of practical difficulties to be overcome, but perhaps a special-
ized naval tactical data systems (NTDS) module could be created
that would filer out sensitive data for observers but allow them
to view the exercise from within.
Fifth, a series of environmental protection measures could
be negotiated. All of these are not necessarily routine, and
each would require careful involvement of additional agencies and
bureaus other that navies. For example, the disposal of naval
nuclear reactors in Russia by the West might be considered. On
the one hand, it is in the best interests of all governments and
navies of the world to ensure that the Russian environmental mess
is cleaned up quickly and safely. On the other hand, if we feel
that the Russians have the technical expertise to perform this
function, we might not want to incur the legal liability for
cleaning up their mess. We would also need to consider if Western
assumption of this responsibility would result in more rubles
being available for defense.
There are a series of cooperative measures that might be
negotiated to deal with other maritime environmental disasters
such as oil spills, pollution control, and responses to environ-
mental warfare. Again, a mechanism needs to be created that
ensures the responsible party retains liability, but other na-
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tions of the world should not remain aloof from a disaster that
would eventually affect their use of the sea.
Rules regulating pollution exist for coastal state's inter-
nal waters, their territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) . How long will it be before international standards are
set for areas of the high seas that are extremely sensitive to
pollution. The Arctic and Antarctic areas are a case in point.
Once these talks begin, how long will it be before naval forces
are now expected to comply with pollution regulations and how
much longer before it is suggested that they not deploy to such
areas to prevent environmental damage?
Bilateral, regional, and finally multilateral planning for
ocean use might be attempted. As more and more users of the
oceans compete for the same space, including navies, planning
might be a way to identify controversies before they erupt into
crises that would require a military response. Environmentalists
should be given a seat at this table so that planned activities
do not affect vital oceans ecosystems.
Sixth, navies might want to propose a series of controls
over maritime technologies that they would like to see regulated.
The proliferation of advanced conventional, and nuclear, weapons
is an area of the highest concern to the United States. Controls
over maritime technologies is an important first step in the
control of proliferation of naval weapons. In the past, the
Western governments had an umbrella organization, the Coordinat-
ing Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) , that
attempted to prevent the flow of technology to the Soviet Union.
Today's dual-use technology transfer issues are far more complex
and require more extensive intelligence gathering and policing.
The Navy should not look to the U.S. government to take the lead
on this issue and should be prepared to advance whatever regula-
tions it would care to see in force.
Seventh, we should require the armed escort of nuclear
materials being shipped at sea. The Japanese took this action in
late 1992, but there ought to be some sort of an international
agreement on the route that such shipments will take and the
escort that is required. The high seas are not at all safe and
the risk of loss of such materials too great to allow shipments
to ply the oceans without protection.
Under the old international security environment, navies had
a well-researched set of rules of engagement (ROEs) that were
primarily designed for use against the Soviet Navy. Under the
new political guidance with primary emphasis on lesser (LRC) and
major (MRC) regional contingencies instead of a European-centered
global war, we need an encyclopedia of rules of engagement for
multiple possibilities. Obviously one set can govern the resur-
gent/emergent global threat (REGT) in much the same manner as the
Soviet Navy. Those type of rules, however, are inappropriate for
LRCs and MRCs.
17
What is needed are, eighth, new national and NATO maritime
ROEs applicable to forward presence out from under the threat of
hair trigger war and rapid but limited crisis response. These
rules need to be created under the strictest admonition that as
Clausewitz wrote, warfare is subordinate to policy. It is en-
tirely possible that new ROEs will result in a higher degree of
risk for our forward deployed forces. If true, this may change
our current position regarding the type of forces that we send on
forward presence missions.
Simply put, we need new ROEs that reflect the new interna-
tional security environment. "'^ These rules will further restrict
the right of the commanding officer to act precipitously in self-
defense. The result of these new rules may be to increase the
numbers of incidents in which U.S. naval forces are damaged or
sunk. Since that risk would be greater, the U.S. might want to
forward deploy more expendable forces and keep its combat cap-
ability as an operational-level reserve that can respond to a
trip wire action.
New maritime ROEs should include CBMs to be employed during
any future crises and perhaps even during a future armed con-
flict. Although such measures have already been discussed for
nuclear war termination, this area needs to also be investigated
for conventional crises and conflicts. For example, the firing
of naval strategic nuclear weapons are an excellent method for a
national leadership to demonstrate positive command and control
over forces during the concluding stages of a nuclear war without
threatening land areas. There are probably other actions that
can be taken at sea which would build confidence during the war
itself, not just steps that we take during peacetime. Such
steps might include unilateral efforts made to slow the pace of
the crisis or to at least limit the area of military actions.
New ROEs should be created recognizing that there is a
"ratchet-like" political effect for the same military actions
taken in different areas of the world's oceans. The inherent
right of a commanding officer to determine hostile intent, mean-
ing an imminent attack, varies with his location. When he is
within his own nation's internal waters, political guidance may
accept little or no risk. As that commanding officer sails
farther from his own shores, the amount of risk that his nation
should allow him to accept will generally increase. Conversely
and because of differences in ocean space, actions taken at sea
can be very effectively used to "signal." An action against a
warship on the high seas will not be taken as seriously as the
same action against the same ship while it is in its own internal
waters.
An ninth area into which we should look is permissive
action links (PALs) . PALs are installed in nuclear weapons and
require receipt of a code or an external signal in order to
achieve a nuclear detonation. PALs are found on U.S. strategic
bombers and in the system to launch our ICBMs. They are also
found on Russian SSBNs. Although called unnecessary for our
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SLBMs (and an emotional issue for the crews involved) , how have
we managed sea-based cruise missiles? Would the West not feel
more secure if we knew how Russian PALs worked? What about PALs
for nations that will field ICBMs or SLBMs in the future? To
ensure security, it may be worth the price of inserting PALs on
American SLBMs. PALs are totally consistent with our obligations
under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of
Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics signed in 1971. If the U.S. and
Russia shift to lower numbers of nuclear weapons and non-prompt
countervalue punishment deterrence strategies, the risk of SLBM
PAL failure might be mitigated with the ability to return to a
port or tender and overcome a technical malfunction.
Major Topics Recommended
In addition to modest CBMs and the more substantial recom-
mendations above, there are a series of even more substantive
actions which should also be taken now. Paralleling agreements
on how to defuse crises at sea should be, first, the resolution
of political issues in the maritime sector. Examples include:
(1) a law of the sea convention that every nation could sign and
ratify without fearing that it is really a vehicle to transfer
wealth from rich to poor nations; (2) boundary disputes at sea,
especially those that involve areas of significant resources such
as the Spratley Islands; and (3) significant cooperative measures
to really deal with piracy and drugs. Despite years of histori-
cal precedents, treaties, and some notable international court
cases, even the right of innocent passage by warships through the
territorial seas of another nation has yet to be settled to
everyone's satisfaction.'*^ Clearly the early 1992 incident
involving the U.S. submarine USS BATON ROUGE indicates that
despite all of our existing agreements with the Russians, we too
need work in this area.
The U.S. is withdrawing from many of its overseas bases and
deployment areas. The world fears rearmament by Japan and other
regional powers. The pressures on Russia to sell armaments to
anyone with hard currency causes increased fears of lower-level
crises, which might get out of hand. As advanced weapons are
increasingly in the hands of less stable elements, the levels of
violence of future crises are less predictable. Before we use
our political differences to justify the retention of a large
fleet, ^^ we should consider the option of, instead, placing
renewed emphasis on reducing the sources of conflict.
Second, the proposed deep cuts in nuclear forces and CFE
follow-ons should be finalized and ratified. After all, we cannot
properly size the fleet until we know our nuclear and NATO pres-
ence, crisis response, and reconstitution requirements. For
example, if we no longer have a requirement for strategic anti-
submarine warfare, we can drastically modify the requirements for
the follow-on, if any, to the improved LOS ANGELES-class submar-
ine. If CFE follow-ons and the concomitant changes in NATO
strategy envisage response times to a major regional contingency
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in Europe to be that of many months, it may fundamentally alter
the plans that we have for active-duty convoy escorts.
When most nations decide on how large their fleets will be,
they first have the political and economic requirements and
limitations in mind. Generally, they then know what role they
will assign to nuclear forces, if any. Once that is done, the
role of ground and air forces need to be established, since after
all, victory in war is exploited by the administration of terri-
tory which requires ground forces. The role assigned to fleets
should generally follow these more important considerations.
This is not to say that fleets are unimportant, but rather to
recognize that their place must be understood before arguments
are made regarding their size. Ratification of CFE and START
follow-ons will have a major influence on the size and composi-
tion of the U.S. Navy.
Third, the U.S. should seriously consider limits on specific
types of naval forces that it does not want to see appear in
other navies of the world. The Chinese have been discussing the
purchase of an aircraft carrier from the Ukraine. Some Japanese
have openly discussed building a carrier of their own if that
were to happen. Why does Thailand need a helicopter carrier?
Does the West desire to see any other nations with SSBNs? Pro-
liferation of naval weaponry is an area that is increasingly more
important to the U.S. and other governments and one that begs for
an international cooperative solution.
The U.S. government should decide what price it is willing
to pay to ensure that navies without aircraft carriers or SSBNs
remain without them. If it means limits on our own building
programs, well we are going to cut the fleet anyway. Perhaps the
time has come to use arms control as a mechanism for the codifi-
cation of the unilateral reductions that each superpower is going
to make anyway. We might then use a bilateral agreement as the
basis for a mechanism to control the naval building programs of
other nations.
When attempting to cut specific types of forces, we should
circumvent stale recommendations made by those whose previous
agendas are no longer appropriate under the new international
security environment. For example, cutting SSNs because "they
will scarcely matter at all in the Persian Gulf, or in similar
crises in the future," indicates that the supporter of such
cuts is out of touch with current thinking for the use of submar-
ines for naval diplomacy and crisis response. ^° We must avoid
regulating those things that have been proposed before simply
because they have been proposed before, or worse, things that are
easy to count.
Fourth, initial discussions for limits on actual forces
might be both limited in terms of specific types of units and
also in individual geographical areas. We might first explore
limits on certain types of exercises in areas of the high seas;
for example operational-level amphibious exercises in the Baltic
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or Black Seas. Coastal states on the littoral of these two seas
might all decide that such a restriction was satisfactory. Simi-
larly, nations might want to preclude exercises in areas of the
high seas that they call historical bays and claim as internal
waters. These would include: Canada's Hudson Bay and Norway's
Varanger Fjord.
If limitations on exercises can be tolerated in a particular
region, then we might consider the permanent restriction of these
type forces from those regions. A strong case could be made to
tie such restrictions to environmentally sensitive areas of the
seas. The need to ensure that national maritime commerce can be
protected precludes the total exclusion of all foreign naval
forces from the high seas. By tying geographic restraints to
types and levels of naval forces that are not required for this
function, however, commerce can be adequately protected with a
commensurate reduction in threats to coastal nations.
Fifth, there have been a number of calls for expanding our
standing cooperative naval forces and even a world or UN Navy."*'
Indeed, we now have a Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAV-
FORMED) and the Russians have joined us in the Persian Gulf. A
multitude of ad hoc and formal alliance structures are overseeing
the current multinational naval blockade in the Adriatic. Before
we jump on the bandwagon for a UN Navy, however, we need to
seriously consider the political ramifications of such a step.
In the meantime, expanded multinational presence with allies,
expanded ad hoc bilateral or multilateral exercises and/or pres-
ence with former enemies is probably the way to go. Before we
get into the business of a UN Navy, we need to first try things
out on a limited basis. Presence before peacekeeping. Peace-
keeping before peacemaking. Regional before global.
Sixth, we need to renegotiate the ABM Treaty, the Navy is
currently prevented from deploying an at-sea GPALS, a goal prom-
ulgated by the Bush administration. At the time that the SALT I
ABM Treaty was negotiated, the Navy favored such a ban. The U.S.
government needs to make the case to the American public and the
Congress that active defenses against ballistic missiles is a
sought-after concept and a legitimate role for the armed forces.
Making that case can be easy, but selling it will be more diffi-
cult given the political strength of arms control advocates. The
best way to fight that battle is to first fight to deploy a ABM
Treaty-compliant system. The Navy should support such efforts
even though it will not increase the Navy's budget. Once that
battle has been won, then the Navy can make a case that the fleet
has a role in continental air and space defense and that at-sea
assets can supplement those based elsewhere. Renegotiating the
ABM Treaty will be required before the Navy can play in GPALS.
Verification and Compliance Issues
A typical example used by inattentive arms control enthu-
siasts to "demonstrate" the advantages of naval arms control is
the 1922 Washington Naval Arms Conference.^® The conference
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placed major constraints only on building then-"strategic" wea-
pons - capital ships and aircraft carriers. There were no regula-
tions concerning submarines and only limited restrictions on
construction of other warships. Even the U.S. has exploited the
ambiguities of this naval arms control agreement. The U.S. Navy
added 3,000 tons in defenses to the 33,000 ton limit for two
battle cruisers being converted to aircraft carriers. ^^
The monetary savings by the U.S. achieved in the 1920s not
building capital ships due to the Washington Naval Arms Confer-
ence was offset by expenses of the 1930s naval arms buildup. The
Washington Conference cannot unquestionably be ^rgued as having
met any of the fundamental goals of arms control.
Is the record any better if we add the naval arms control
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, the 1930 and 1936 London
Treaty and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement? No — none of
the inter-war years naval arms control efforts met the basic
objectives of arms control. On the other hand, it can be argued
that any violations of these agreements did not have any signifi-
cant role in the outcome of World War II. That is not, neces-
sarily, the point, however. A major lesson learned from these
previous naval arms control agreements is that they limit neces-
sary preparation for deterring wars that were eventually fought.
The legacy of previous naval arms control agreements tends
to argue that they also deterred democracies from exposing total-
itarian nations openly violating such agreements. For example,
Great Britain actually had an Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar
dry dock, weighed it, found it in excess of a 10,000 ton treaty
limit, and hid their findings. ^^ In another case, the Admiralty
continued to record the incorrect and treaty-compliant tonnage
for the German battleship BISMARK even after it was sunk and the
Royal Navy's Intelligence Division had examined the ship's logs
and 115 members of the surviving crew. It was not until twelve
months after the sinking, when the Soviet Union handed over its
own intelligence estimates that the British Admiralty accepted
the conclusions of its own intelligence service.
Traditional security policies are monitored by intelligence
with little or not legal or political oversight. Arms control is
monitored by technical-legal compliance politics. The verifica-
tion of compliance with an agreement is a political decision; one
in which the presumption of compliance is automatically made
until there is "proof" of noncompliance. Obtaining a finding of
"proof" of noncompliance is often hampered by the perceived need
to then "do something" in response. Acknowledgement of a failure
of arms control is often tantamount to a political failure of the
highest order; thus the bias will often be to not find any non-
compliance.
Democracies always promise to expose violations (and do not
always) and assume they will have strategic warning of any
"significant" violations allowing rebuilding and rearming —
which they rarely do until too late. We are making similar
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assumptions today about the warning times associated with an
REGT!
Perhaps one of the most damning records of compliance polit-
ics is a minor anecdote within the larger story of the failure of
the victorious powers to constrain Germany to her obligations
under the Versailles Treaty. One of the most telling accounts of
the levels to which compliance politics had sunk is the following
remark made by a British naval inspector at the Inter-Allied
Military Control Commission to his German counterpart:^^
It is now time for us to separate. Both you
and I are glad that we are leaving. Your
task was unpleasant and so was mine. One
thing I should point out. You should not
feel that we believed what you told us. Not
one word you uttered was true, but you deliv-
ered your information in such a way that we
were in a position to believe you. I want to
thank you for this.
In 1933, the government of Germany underwent a major change.
Up until then, marginal cheating on arms control agreements by
Germany were taken seriously but did not cause significant alarm.
After the 1933 change in government, marginal cheating proved
downright dangerous to the stability of the world's
democracies. ^° There are many totalitarian nations still on the
horizons and caution should be our watchword with regard to
verification and compliance.
One can argue that the record of all arms control is poor at
best. We are frequently confused by proponents who insist that
adherence to a treaty is more important than ensuring the securi-
ty of the nation. Technical debates over verification demand a
great deal of attention with little or no thought ever given to
ensuring compliance with the agreement. Verification is not the
problem. Generally we can verify non-compliance to a level that
would be accepted by an intelligence specialist.^'
The Krasnoyarsk radar is the classic case in point. We were
bombarded, with opinion by arms control supporters that the
Krasnoyarsk radar was not a technical violation or not strategi-
cally significant. Even if it were a violation, we were told
that what mattered more is supporting the arms control process.
Similarly, the U.S. government apparently had the proper evidence
it needed to allege non-compliance by the Soviet Union with the
1972 BWC.^° Compliance politics is the problem — it is not the
technical ability of the intelligence community to verify noncom-
pliance!
The history of verification and compliance with previous
arms control must be taken into account when considering new
measures. Rather than assume that arms control can never work or
that it doesn't matter if it doesn't work well as long as it
builds a process, we should look at the verification and com-
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pliance issue squarely during the process of deciding whether to
even engage in a negotiation. We must answer then, "what after
violation?" We must also ask ourselves if cheating on the
margin matters? Accompanying any proposal for control of naval
arms should be a thorough discussion of responses to noncom-
pliance. Withdrawal from a treaty is but an extreme reaction.
Proportional responses need to also be thoroughly discussed.
Despite the well-documented history of previous arms control
verification and compliance problems, consideration of these
issues for naval arms control should be done from the perspective
of the new maritime aspects to be regulated rather than only from
previous experiences. The existing verification and compliance
literature is already thoroughly researched and equally thorough-
ly politicized. Selective use of the biased existing literature
would both support (1) advocates of naval arms control dismissing
verification and compliance problems based upon our historical
record; or (2) support a critic arguing that naval arms control
should not be pursued because of inherent problems.
There will undoubtably be verification and compliance issues
to consider with naval arms control. For example, what do we do
the first time an Iranian KILO submarine "inadvertently" strays
into a zone of peace? What do we do the fifth time it happens,
since it is more than likely that we will do nothing the first
four times? Does it matter if the submarine strays in 1 mile or
10 miles; or for 10 minutes or 10 hours? If our assumption is
that for existing conventional arms control, not every violation
matters, should this also be our assumption for naval arms con-
trol?
Verification and compliance issues, however, should be
approached from a fresh start -- one that first addresses the
maritime arms or operations to be regulated and only then at-
tempts to consider them. -^ Perhaps in this way we will not doom
consideration of these issues to tired knee-jerk diatribes.
Verification and compliance issues cannot be ignored but simply
must be approached with an open mind, thus necessitating the
utmost of rigor and caution.
The SALT I Interim Agreement contains a provision for the
non-interference with national technical means (NTMs) of verifi-
cation. NTMs will be an inadequate method of verification of
naval arms control, but the concept of a commitment to not inter-
fere with whatever forms of verification should be retained for
naval arms control. Since many of our methods of verification
will involve extremely sensitive naval operations, negotiations
must be monitored to ensure that sensitive intelligence capabili-
ties are not revealed.
One of the issues that will need to be addressed is the
status of these agreements during crises and declared wars.
Generally, proponents assume that CBMs would only be valid during
peacetime.^ A closer examination of the issues instructs us
that some international agreements actually come into full effect
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upon the outbreak of war, others some to an end, some are sus-
pended, while others remain in force. ^ Each possibility will
need to be carefully considered before concluding any agreements.
The validity of agreements may also vary with the types of
crises and wars that exist. For example, if a nation is a party
to a NWFZ, it could be argued that this nation is also automati-
cally adopting a no first nuclear use in that zone. If that
nation retained nuclear weapons outsize the NWFZ, the no first
nuclear use might not apply outside the zone — thus reinforcing
the need for more comprehensive ROEs. Similarly, parties that
have not adopted no first nuclear use but have agreed to a NWFZ,
such as the U.S., should already have comprehensive ROEs for such
contingencies.
The costs of verification should not be assumed as marginal;
these too need to be assessed — especially in an era of dimin-
ishing defense budgets — although generally there will always be
more savings associated with arms control than costs of verifica-
tion and compliance. °^
One of the best examples of a naval arms control agreement
is the demilitarization of the Great Lakes by the Rush-Bagot
Treaty. Seldom mentioned, however, is the general disregard for
this treaty's specific provisions by the U.S. since our Civil
War. How many of us realize that the U.S. Navy had training
aircraft carriers in the Great Lakes during World War II? The
Rush-Bagot Treaty clearly illustrates that nations settle their
political differences first, then sign arms control agreements in
which technical or even significant violations are meaningless
while the political climate remains comfortable.
Conclusions
Upon scrutiny, the "slippery slope" argument erodes with the
evidence that the Navy has successfully managed to minimize the
impact of arms control agreements while on that slope. A compar-
ison of arms control agreements regulating air and naval forces
might cause one to conclude that navies have created the illusion
of non-regulation while their brothers in arms have been forced
to deal with the issues on a daily basis. There are no intui-
tively obvious reasons that navies should be exempt from routine
considerations of arms control because they are inherently
"unique. "^^ Liking it is optional — the Navy, like all military
forces, should be required to represent itself in all arms con-
trol fora and make the best case that they can for whatever their
position is. One must assume that the Navy has the talent to
argue its case well since it has managed the "slippery slope" so
well for so many years.
The Navy probably should be regulated in ways that it has
not contemplated in the past. A summary of the recommended areas
for regulation contained herein if found in Table 2:
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TABLE 2
NEW NAVAL ARMS CONTROL RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Expanded Confidence Building Measures
Exchanges of Data
Transparency in Policy, Doctrine, Strategy, Force Structure
INCSEA
Cooperative Measures
Agreement on Laws of Submarine Warfare
II. Revision to Current Policies
Abolish NCND
No First Tactical Nuclear Use at Sea
NWFZs
Advance Notification of Operational-level Exercises
Environmental Protection Measures
Controls Over Maritime Technologies
Armed Escort of Nuclear Shipments
ROEs
PALs
III. Major Areas for Agreements
Resolution of Political Issues at Sea
Deep Cuts in Nuclear Forces and CFE Follow-ons
Limits on Specific Naval Forces
Geographic Limits
Expand Standing Naval Forces
Renegotiate ABM Treaty
Source: the author
The Navy needs to participate in any future arms control
discussions involving fleet forces or operations as an active
party to that process. The fleets of the world are being hobbled
and undermined substantially by budgetary reductions. Navies must
understand that they must be a major participant in that process,
to minimize the unctuous intemperate actions of the normal polit-
ical process. Navies cannot run the risks of having governments
concur in arms control decisions without the discerning expert
counsel of the leaders of the sea services. These are difficult
and unpalatable issues for the Navy but so were the budget cuts
that resulted in the Base Force — generally without the input of
the Navy.
Equally important for the Navy will be internal work within
policy and intelligence divisions to devise: (1) a set of goals
for the process; (2) own and allied forces and operations to be
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protected; (3) other national forces and operations we would like
to see regulated; and (4) the price we are willing to pay to
ensure the achievement of (1) - (3). ° This implies that naval
arms control is not "played" as a non-zero sum game; indeed, the
history of past arms control clearly demonstrates that it is a
zero sum game that can have extremely adverse consequences on
democracies negotiating with totalitarian nations.
Discussions about naval arms control are currently on-going
in a series of small, but important, international conferences
largely ignored by the U.S. Navy. The messages that the Navy
would receive, if it attended these conferences, is mixed, howev-
er. For example, one civilian academic from Moscow's Institute
of World Economy and International Relations, told a Western
audience in June 1990 that the then-Soviet Union was no longer
interested in naval arms control because inter alia it had more
important things to do.^^ Two years later, another Russian
civilian delivered the opposite message.
Naval arms control, however, involves more than just the
U.S. and Russia. Indeed, it would appear that many other nations
are developing their own naval arms control regimes in regional
areas without the participation of these two countries. The
risk, of course, is that these regional agreements will eventual-
ly involve the U.S. Navy but in a manner that will not be obvi-
ous. For example, if a regional group of nations first elect to
regulate transit by merchant ships through straits, in order to
protect those ships from piracy and to protect the environment,
it is unlikely that the U.S. government would object. Once that
precedent has been agreed to, however, a next step might be to
regulate oceanographic research vessels and oilers serving as
naval auxiliaries.
Obviously the U.S. government would consider such actions
more serious and might even object. The political guidance to
the U.S. Navy, however, might be that other considerations are
more important with those nations and restrictions on freedom of
navigation is an acceptable price to pay. The point is that
these kind of discussions are ongoing in the world and the U.S.
Navy generally is not a participant.
If the U.S. Navy remains aloof from discussions of naval
arms control, it is possible that a new model will develop for
American military participation in international politics. This
new model is prevalent in other nations; a model wherein academ-
ics and the politically aware public debate issues, influencing
the government through elected officials and decision makers,
with the bureaucracy expected to enforce these decisions.
It appears that the U.S. Navy has become a full partner in
the Department of the Defense and embraced "jointness." That
being the case, there is little further role for claims that
"naval warfare must be considered unique," and this uniqueness
justifies the attitude of exempting naval forces from arms con-
trol constraints.'^ Naval warfare is not unique and there is no
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inherent reason to exclude naval forces from the debates over
arms control that are on-going in the world.
We must disclaim the perception that the U.S. is stonewall-
ing on arms control, ^ if only to ensure that the train does not
leave the station without the fleet. Navies should not float
outside the mainstream political process involving possible arms
control but must explain frankly and in uncomplicated terms to
those more comfortable with military operations ashore why cer-
tain concepts are not transferable to the sea services. It is
not up to the land-oriented to learn about the sea but rather for
the fleet to explain its special circumstances to others. The
U.S. Navy cannot refuse to participate in the naval arms control
process — after all, we are already doing it!
Perhaps the subject of naval arms control will present
itself within the new administration or within the Democratic-
controlled Congress. If the new administration is serious about
the subject, it will wrest control of this issue from the Navy
and move it to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) or
some other agency of the government. This may be the only way to
force the Navy to address the issue, since it appears that it
will not do so on its own. The question that the Navy must ask
itself is if it is better to be in the tank with the sharks when
trying to save the fleet or outside looking in? The Navy that I
know has always been willing to stand tall under extreme condi-
tions of adversity. It should do so again.
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